Quantifier variance entails that ‘there exists’ has a variety of meanings. Determining what makes all these meanings quantifier meanings is a problem associated with this view (the problem of meaning variance). A reasonable candidate suggested by Hirsch is the set of formal rules governing quantification. However, the collapse argument presents a notorious objection to the viability of the candidate: there cannot be more than one quantifier obeying the same rules up to logical equivalence. It is proposed that a quantifier variantist who intends to retain Hirsch’s proposed solution can admit a many-sorted language in order to block the collapse argument. Within the many-sorted language, a Kaplanian thesis about the rules governing sor
Vagueness in the World: A Supervaluationist Approach
Ali Abasnezhad, Davood Hosseini
Journal Papers , 2014 January , {Pages 239-255 }
Abstract
A na?ve perspective on the world suggests that the world we live in is full of vague objects. In this chapter, a version of the supervaluationist framework will be proposed to provide a systematic conception of such a na?ve perspective. Precisifications of a vague object will be characterized as objects that, were they actual objects, every determinate truth about the vague object would be true about them. It will be argued that this view is more effective than other versions of supervaluationism at accommodating commonsensical and metaphysical considerations. The view leaves room for vague identity as a kind of “no fact of the matter.” Thus, Evans’ argument against ontic vagueness fails in a natural way.