Future Contingency has been an old debate between philosophers throughout history. On one hand, Aristotle thinks events of the future happen contingently. On the other hand, Diodorus believes what happens in the future is now determined. Diodorus has presented an argument for determinism based on a few premises. Logicians and philosophers try to avoid determinism by denying the first premise of Diodorus, which is the necessity of the past. However, they only regard a qualified version of this premise based on the medieval argument for determinism while some other philosophers consider this premise in a general way. A new argument shall be presented in this paper for determinism similar to the medieval one based on the general version of the

Inconsistency of methodological naturalism and religious beliefs has been the most important reason for theists to oppose methodological naturalism. But some philosophers defend methodological naturalism based on their theological dispositions. They believe that theological motivations can lead to a naturalistic methodology. In this paper we review and criticize two prominent types of these arguments and show their deficiencies: First we review arguments which concentrate on difficulties of" Divine Action" problem. According to them rejecting methodological naturalism leads to God of Gaps theology which is awkward and non-religious. Secondly we discuss arguments which aim to prove that supernatural entities could not be described via limite

The logical constants are defined by operational rules in the inferentialism theory of meaning. Arthur Prior’s counterexample (Tonk) makes a major challenge for the inferentialism. He shows that every arbitrary operational rule can describe a logical constant and this makes logical constants defective and incompatible with the system. In response to this problem, Belnap Offers conservativeness and uniqueness requirements for the operational rules. In this paper, we have evaluated the conservativeness requirement. The main question investigated is “how the conservativeness as a criterion provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for logical constant definition?” The hypothesis that we are to establish is the inability to achieve

The argument based on the existence of evil in the world, as an atheistic argument against the existence of God, has two versions: logical and evidential. In this article, we have merely dealt with the first version that attempts to prove a logical inconsistency in the theists’ set of beliefs. Many hold that the traditional logical problem of evil has found a definite answer through Plantinga’s free will defense. However, in recent years, John Schellenberg has claimed a new logical problem of evil. He holds that Plantinga’s free will defense would not refute this new version. In the present paper, without any concern for fully criticizing Schellenberg’s new problem of evil and without any intent for completely representing Plantinga

According to the dominant methodology of contemporary analytic philosophy, philosophical intuitions play evidential roles for or against philosophical theories. However, intuitions can play the supposed role successfully only if they are justified. Phenomenalism, as one of the proposed theories that aim to explain and argue for justifiedness of intuitions, claim that intuitions are justified because they have a certain phenomenal character: Intuitive contents seem to be true. Furthermore, it argues that sensory perception has similar phenomenal character, in virtue of which it is justified. This analogy confirms the justifiedness of intuitions. In this article, however, we argue that there is at least one another epistemological feature of

This paper addresses the differences between the two terms,“existence” and “existent”, in the framework of “indirect reference theory” and tries to answer whether or not the proposition “Existence is existent” is an analytical one. The research shows that on the vocabulary level, none of the two has any additional presentation to the other. Also, when by “existence” we mean “nominal existence”, their two referents are the same. But, on the sense level, ie, the mode of presentation or grasping the referent,“existence” and “existent” are different, and, so, the proposition “Existence is existent” cannot not be an analytical one. But, when “existence” refers to “the necessary existence”, the senses a

Gentzen divides rules of logical system into ‘operational rules’ and ‘structural rules’. By operational rules she means the rules of introduction and elimination of a logical constant. Structural rules represent the fundamental (structural) characteristics of an argument in such a way that any change in them causes changing in the whole system. In his works, Gentzen mentions that the meaning of logical constants can be achieved only through operational rules. This point is the infrastructure of inferentialism approach on meaningfulness of logical constants. Christopher Peacocke criticizes the basis of inferentialism approach. He believes that all structural and operational rules should be considered as the definition of logical cons

Kosta Došen presented the meaningful Inferentialism from the logical constants based on the structural rules in the Logical constants as punctuations marks paper. Having mentioned the difference between analysis and definition, he argues that structural rules merely make an analysis of logical constants, not the definition. Since, the definition should meet the conditions of analysis as well as two Pascal's condition and Conservativeness. The Pascal's condition will not be met in logical constants. In this study, the conditions of analysis and definition are studies. In addition, it is shown that if the conditions related to the analysis and definition were accepted, not only the Inferentialism cannot provide a definition for logical const

Tabatabaei's view about the relationship between religion and philosophy can be considered in two stages: formation and understanding. He introduces revelation as an unknown method. Therefore, the methodological relation between religion and philosophy cannot be explained well. To provide its content, scripture uses a common language which is conventional. Besides, religion has reached its summit later than philosophy. The relationship between religion and philosophy in the understanding stage in Tabatabaei's view is based on interpretation of Quran by Quran. This method of interpretation can be used for completion of philosophy that all its theorems are rooted in Monotheism.